

THE HONORABLE THOMAS S. ZILLY

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE**

Case No.: 19-cv-00805-TSZ

tinyBuild LLC,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
v.
Nival International Limited,
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff
and
Sergey Orlovskiy,
Defendant.

**NIVAL INTERNATIONAL
LIMITED’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT**

Noted for Consideration:
May 1, 2020

Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Nival International Limited (“Nival”), by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby moves this honorable Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Counts Four (Misappropriation of Trade Secrets) and Five (Conversion) of Plaintiff tinyBuild

1 LLC's First Amended Complaint.¹ As detailed below, these causes of action
 2 should be dismissed because (1) there are no protectible trade secrets at issue in
 3 this case (whether alleged or otherwise), (2) misappropriation was not properly
 4 alleged (nor could it be alleged), and (3) conversion is barred by the economic loss
 5 rule.

6 **I. Legal Standard**

7 To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege more than just
 8 conclusions that are merely consistent with liability. As the United States Supreme
 9 Court held in *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*:

10 To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
 11 factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is
 12 plausible on its face." ... A claim has facial plausibility when the
 13 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
 14 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
 15 alleged.... The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability
 16 requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
 17 defendant has acted unlawfully.... Where a complaint pleads facts that
 18 are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of
 19 the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'"

20 ...

21 In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss
 22 can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no
 23 more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While
 24

25 ¹ This Motion is brought only on behalf of Defendant Nival. Undersigned counsel
 26 do not, at current time, represent Defendant Sergey Orlovskiy in his personal
 27 capacity, who, at least as shown on the docket in this case, has not yet been served
 28 process in this case.

1 legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must
 2 be supported by factual allegations.

3 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (internal citations omitted).

4 On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “[t]he court typically
 5 cannot consider evidence beyond the four corners of the complaint, although it
 6 may rely on a document to which the complaint refers if the document is central to
 7 the party’s claims and its authenticity is not in question.... The court may also
 8 consider evidence subject to judicial notice.” *T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Huawei*
 9 *Device USA, Inc.*, 115 F.Supp.3d 1184, 1191 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (citing *Marder v.*
 10 *Lopez*, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir.2006) and *United States v. Ritchie*, 342 F.3d
 11 903, 908 (9th Cir.2003)).

12 **II. Factual Background**

13 Though Nival denies many of the allegations set forth in the First Amended
 14 Complaint (Docket No. 36, the “FAC”), for the purposes of this Motion to
 15 Dismiss, Nival acknowledges that the Court must accept all well-plead factual
 16 matters as true. Accordingly, Nival hereby summarizes the relevant allegations
 17 therein.

18 On March 29, 2018, tinyBuild, Nival, and non-party Savvas Petras entered
 19 into a Development and Publishing Agreement (the “Agreement”). FAC, ¶ 7.
 20 Under the Agreement, Savvas Petras would design, and Nival would develop, a
 21 video game (the “Product”) that tinyBuild would then publish. FAC, ¶ 8.
 22 Although the Agreement is not attached to the FAC, it was attached to Nival
 23 Answer and Counterclaim (Docket No. 11-1) and may be relied upon by this Court
 24 as it is a document referred to by the FAC, central to tinyBuild’s claims, and its
 25 authenticity is not in question. *See Marder*, 450 F.3d at 448. A copy of the
 26 Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 for convenience.

1 tinyBuild alleges that Nival converted and misappropriated the source code
 2 to the Product when the relationship between the parties broke down and Nival did
 3 not release to tinyBuild the source code Nival developed. FAC, ¶ 28.² tinyBuild
 4 alleged causes of action against Nival for breach of the Agreement. FAC, pp. 6-7.

5 In support of its claim of misappropriation, tinyBuild alleges that the
 6 Agreement “prevents Nival from using tinyBuild’s source code and other
 7 proprietary, non-public information for purposes unrelated to the Product and from
 8 disclosing such information to a third party in the absence of a legal duty or court
 9 order.” FAC, ¶ 51.

10 The FAC also alleges that “On information and belief, Nival also retained
 11 tinyBuild’s source code for purposes unrelated to the Product, including work for
 12 third parties.” FAC, ¶ 53. The FAC provides no factual content regarding the
 13 alleged work unrelated to the Product or for third parties.

14 **III. tinyBuild Failed to Properly Plead, and Cannot Properly Plead, a Cause**
 15 **of Action for Misappropriation of Trade Secrets**

16 Count Four of the FAC is a cause of action for misappropriation of trade
 17 secrets in violation of the Washington Uniform Trade Secret Act and the Federal
 18 Defend Trade Secret Act. FAC, p. 8. As the Washington and Federal trade secret
 19 acts are substantially the same, at least for the purposes of this Motion, this Motion
 20 will focus on the specific language of Washington statute, all of which would also
 21 apply to the Federal statute. *Compare* Wash. Code. § 19.108.010 *with* 18 U.S.C. §
 22 1839.

26 ² Nival denies that it had any obligation to release the source code to tinyBuild, or
 27 that tinyBuild has any ownership rights in the source code, and reserves all
 28 arguments on these issues.

(iii) Before a material change of his or her position, knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake.

Wash. Code § 19.108.010(2).

Finally, the statute states that “‘Improper means’ includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.” Wash. Code § 19.108.010(1).

B. tinyBuild Has Failed to Allege (and Cannot in Good Faith Allege) that Any “Trade Secret” is at Issue

The Uniform Trade Secret Act requires that any “trade secret” sought to be protected under the act be “subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” Wash. Code § 19.108.010(4)(b). *See, also*, 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (requiring that an owner of purported trade secrets take reasonable measures to keep such information secret).

The only allegation in the FAC that in any manner relates to any efforts to keep secrecy is Paragraph 51, where tinyBuild alleges that “[t]he Agreement prevents Nival from using tinyBuild’s source code and other proprietary, non-public information for purposes unrelated to the Product and from disclosing such information to a third party in the absence of a legal duty or court order.”

However, the only provisions on the Agreement that relate to confidentiality and non-disclosure is Section 11 of the Agreement, which does *not* say what tinyBuild alleges it says. In relevant part, Section 11 of the Agreement reads as follows:

(a) Publisher, Developer and Designer recognize that, in connection with the performance of this Agreement, each of them may disclose to the other information about the disclosing party’s business or activities, which such party considers proprietary and confidential. All of such

1 proprietary and confidential information of each party (which shall
2 include, without limitation, all business, financial and technical
3 information of each party, identities of customers, clients or licensees,
4 proprietary source code and any other information whether oral or
5 written which is not generally known or available to the public) is
6 hereinafter referred to as “Confidential Information.”

7 (b) The party who receives Confidential Information agrees to
8 maintain the confidential status for such Confidential Information, not
9 to use any such Confidential Information for any purpose other than the
10 purpose for which it was originally disclosed to the receiving party, and
11 not to disclose any of such Confidential Information to any third party
12 unless required by law or court order.

13 Agreement, § 11.

14 The source code is not “Confidential Information” as defined in the
15 Agreement, and nothing in the Agreement obligates Nival to maintain the secrecy
16 of the source code. This is because, as alleged in the First Amended Complaint
17 itself, *Nival developed the source code itself and never received it from tinyBuild.*
18 FAC, ¶ 8. In fact, the main thrust of tinyBuild’s remaining causes of action in this
19 case and the relief it requests are that the Court order Nival to release the source
20 code to tinyBuild because tinyBuild has never even seen it. FAC, ¶¶ 28, 30, 35,
21 45, 53, 59 and Request for Relief, ¶ 6.

22 In other words, because tinyBuild never “disclose[d]” the source code to
23 Nival, it cannot be deemed Confidential Information pursuant to Section 11(a) of
24 the Agreement. And even if it was “Confidential Information,” because Nival
25 never “receive[d]” the source code from tinyBuild, the obligations of secrecy under
26 Section 11(b) are inapplicable.

1 Accordingly, tinyBuild has not properly alleged (nor does there exist) any
 2 “efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain [the] secrecy” of
 3 the source code, and therefore the source code cannot be the basis for a claim of
 4 misappropriation because it is not a trade secret as defined by the statute. *Compare*
 5 *with T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Huawei Device USA, Inc.*, 115 F.Supp.3d 1184, 1193
 6 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (“T-Mobile described many security measures, including
 7 limits on access to its clean room, limits on who could enter it, efforts to monitor
 8 what occurred in the clean room, and efforts to immediately address Huawei’s theft
 9 of information from the clean room. That is more than enough to plausibly allege
 10 reasonable efforts to protect its trade secrets.”).

11 Quite to the contrary, tinyBuild has taken actions in this litigation, which the
 12 Court may take under consideration under judicial notice, with the explicit
 13 intention that the source code at issue be *excluded* as confidential information. On
 14 September 27, 2019, Nival filed a motion for protective order. Docket No. 21. In
 15 that motion, Nival sought to allow the source code to be subject to the protective
 16 order because (1) the unrestricted release of the source code to tinyBuild through
 17 discovery would moot a large portion of this litigation and (2) the source code
 18 contains Nival’s own proprietary trade secrets which were developed prior to
 19 entering into the Agreement and which were used to build the source code for the
 20 Project (see Section 1.4 of the Agreement).

21 tinyBuild, however, explicitly objected to allowing any source code ***that was***
 22 ***related to the Project*** from being covered by the protective order, which would
 23 essentially permit unlimited disclosure of the source code. Specifically, in
 24 tinyBuild’s proposed protective order, tinyBuild proposed that only “source code
 25 unrelated to the ‘Product’ as defined in the Development and Publishing
 26 Agreement between tinyBuild and Nival (Dkt. 11-1)” be covered by the Protective
 27 Order. Docket No. 21-3, p. 2. In opposing Nival’s motion for protective order,

1 tinyBuild went so far as to claim that allowing the protective order to cover source
 2 code related to the Project was “overly broad” and that “Nival has no basis to
 3 assert confidentiality over [the] source code....”³ Docket No. 22, p. 8.

4 Because tinyBuild has not taken reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of
 5 the source code, the source code is not a trade secret and accordingly there could
 6 be no misappropriation of trade secrets. Therefore, the cause of action should be
 7 dismissed.

8 **C. tinyBuild Has Failed to Properly Allege Misappropriation**

9 Even if the source code is deemed to be tinyBuild’s trade secret as defined
 10 under statute, tinyBuild has failed to properly allege misappropriation of the source
 11 code under any of the definitions for misappropriation.

12 Half of the forms of misappropriation enumerated in the statute can be
 13 summarily dismissed because there was no “improper means” under which Nival
 14 came to possess the source code. Because Nival developed the source code itself,
 15 Nival never obtained the source code through “theft, bribery, misrepresentation,
 16 breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage
 17 through electronic or other means.” Wash. Code § 19.108.010(1). *See, also*, 18
 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6) (substantially similar definition of “improper means”). Because
 19 there were no “improper means,” there could not have been misappropriation
 20 under its sub-definitions (a), (b)(i) or (b)(ii)(A) (see definition of misappropriation,
 21 *supra*).

22 And because Nival developed the source code itself, Nival did not acquire
 23 the source code “by accident or mistake,” removing any possibility of

24
 25 ³ Again, Nival’s primary purpose of seeking coverage for the Product’s source
 26 code under the Protective Order was to ensure that the discovery process was not
 27 used as a means to gain access to what Nival maintains tinyBuild has no right
 28 because tinyBuild failed to pay Nival for its work. *See, generally*, Nival’s
 Counterclaims, Docket No. 11.

1 misappropriation under definition (b)(iii), nor did Nival derive it from some other
2 person with a duty to tinyBuild, halting any relief under definition (b)(ii)(C).

3 That leaves tinyBuild with potential relief solely under definition (b)(ii)(B),
4 which defines misappropriation as “Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another
5 without express or implied consent by a person who ... at the time of disclosure or
6 use, knew or had reason to know that his or her knowledge of the trade secret
7 was ... acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or
8 limit its use.”

9 As already stated above, there were no circumstances giving rise to a duty to
10 maintain secrecy or limit use because the explicit Agreement between the parties
11 did not in fact include such limitations.

12 But, beyond that, tinyBuild has not plausibly alleged that Nival disclosed or
13 used the source code beyond that which was authorized under the Agreement. The
14 *only* allegation regarding disclosure or use of the source code beyond that
15 authorized under the Agreement is that “[o]n information and belief, NIVAL also
16 retained tinyBuild’s source code for purposes unrelated to the product, including
17 work for third parties.” FAC, ¶ 53.

18 However, this allegation fails to satisfy the pleading standards set forth in
19 *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*. The allegation presents nothing more than a “sheer possibility
20 that [Nival] has acted unlawfully” and is just “merely consistent” with Nival’s
21 liability, stopping short of providing any factual allegations that support the legal
22 conclusion. 556 U.S. at 678-79. This allegation was included in the FAC for no
23 purpose other than to proffer a conclusion vaguely consistent with the cause of
24 action with no factual basis. Moreover, the allegation does not even go so far as to
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26
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say that Nival has *actually* used or disclosed the source code, only that Nival is retaining it for a *possibility*, leaving it far from the line drawn in *Iqbal*.⁴

Paragraph 53 also contains an allegation that Nival “retained the source code for purposes of extracting additional funds from tinyBuild,” yet there is no plausible way to read this allegation as misappropriation because “retaining” purported trade secrets cannot be deemed to be misappropriating them, particularly in the context that Nival was seeking payment for its services before delivering possession of the source code. Nival neither disclosed nor used the source code – it only retained it subject to being paid for having developed it. Mere possession of the source code by Nival – source code which Nival developed and which tinyBuild has never seen – cannot reasonably be considered a violation of confidentiality or a misappropriation of a trade secrets.

Accordingly, tinyBuild has failed to allege a cause of action for misappropriation because there was, in fact and in law, no misappropriation. Therefore, the cause of action for misappropriation should be dismissed.

IV. The Cause of Action for Conversion is Barred by the Economic Loss

Rule

tinyBuild alleges that Nival committed the tort of conversion by willfully retaining possession of the source code (that Nival developed itself). FAC, ¶ 8, 57-59. However, tinyBuild’s own allegations in the First Amended Complaint are that its rights to the source code arise out of the Agreement (though Nival disputes that tinyBuild has *any* rights to the source code). FAC, ¶ 56.

⁴ Nival notes that voluminous written and document discovery has already been completed in this case and that if there was evidence of improper use or disclosure, tinyBuild could have included it in the FAC. However, because there is no such evidence, tinyBuild has plead non-specific allegations “on information and belief.”

1 In these cases, where a claimant's purported rights arise from a contract
 2 without any independent duty, a claimant cannot maintain a cause of action under
 3 tort because it is barred by, as it is known in Washington, the economic loss rule.
 4 "The economic loss rule applies to hold parties to their contract remedies when a
 5 loss potentially implicated both tort and contract relief.... The rule prohibits
 6 plaintiffs from recovering in tort economic losses to which their entitlement flows
 7 only from a contract because tort law is not intended to compensate parties for
 8 losses suffered as a result of a breach of duties assumed only by agreement."
 9 *Alejandro v. Bull*, 159 Wash.2d 674, 681-82 (2007) (multiple internal quotation
 10 marks and citations omitted). *See, also, Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc.*,
 11 170 Wash.2d 380, 389 (2010) ("An injury is remediable in tort if it traces back to
 12 the breach of a tort duty arising independently of the terms of the contract.... When
 13 no independent tort duty exists, tort does not provide a remedy.").

14 In this case, tinyBuild itself alleges that Nival developed the source code
 15 itself (FAC, ¶ 8) and that tinyBuild's rights to the source code, to the extent they
 16 exist at all, arise from the Agreement (FAC, ¶ 56). There is no independent tort
 17 duty alleged, nor can one plausibly be read into the First Amended Complaint.

18 Quite simply then, because tinyBuild's purported right to receive the source
 19 code stems solely from a contract, tinyBuild cannot maintain a separate cause of
 20 action for conversion against Nival because it is barred by the economic loss rule.
 21 Accordingly, the cause of action for conversion must be dismissed.

22 **V. Conclusion**

23 As detailed above, tinyBuild's cause of action for misappropriation of trade
 24 secrets should be dismissed because there are no protectible trade secrets at issue in
 25 this case and misappropriation was not properly alleged. Furthermore, tinyBuild's
 26 cause of action for conversion is barred by the economic loss rule and must also be
 27

1 dismissed. Accordingly, Nival hereby respectfully requests the court dismiss the
2 Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action in the First Amended Complaint.

3
4 Respectfully submitted,
5 Nival International Limited,
6 By its Attorneys,

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26 Dated: April 3, 2020
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Certificate of Service

I hereby certify on the date indicated below, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to all parties who have appeared in this matter.

Dated: April 3, 2020 /s/ Philip P. Mann